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Abstract
Internet market makers are always facing intense competitive environment,
where personalized price reductions or discounted coupons are provided for at-
tracting more customers. Participants in such a price war scenario have to invest a
lot to catch up with other competitors. However, such a huge cost of money may
not always lead to an improvement of market share. This is mainly due to a lack of
information about others’ strategies or customers’ willingness when participants
develop their strategies.
In order to obtain this hidden information through observable data, we study
the relationship between companies and customers in the Internet price war. Theo-
retically, we provide a formalization of the problem as a stochastic game with im-
perfect and incomplete information. Then we develop a variant of Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) to infer latent variables under the current market environment,
which represents the preferences of customers and strategies of competitors. To
our best knowledge, it is the first time that LDA is applied to game scenario.
We conduct simulated experiments where our LDA model exhibits a signifi-
cant improvement on finding strategies in the Internet price war by including all
available market information of the market maker’s competitors. And the model
is applied to an open dataset for real business. Through comparisons on the like-
lihood of prediction for users’ behavior and distribution distance between inferred
opponent’s strategy and the real one, our model is shown to be able to provide a
better understanding for the market environment.
Our work marks a successful learning method to infer latent information in the
environment of price war by the LDA modeling, and sets an example for related
competitive applications to follow.
*Equal contribution
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1 Introduction
Price reduction, sometimes even below cost, is a classic tactic in market competitions,
commonly referred to as a price war [13]. It has become a popular strategy for the
Internet platform competitions in recent years. It is employed as a standard marketing
technique to recruit participants, to boost up membership, to venture into new frontiers,
and ultimately, to eliminate competitors.
Uber, dubbed as World War Uber [6], has fought to conquer the world’s ride-hailing
market one by one in the past ten years. Even though Uber has yet to make a profit
until the third quarter 2017 [28], its strategy of deep subsidies to attract customers
has been widely adopted by the Internet companies, especially businesses built by mo-
bile apps. Similar tactics have been used in traditional industries such as the airlines,
retails, crude oils. But only in the context of the Internet platforms of goods and ser-
vices, this strategy has become prevailing and fast evolving. The casualties of the war
are globally visible. In the recent years, we have witnessed price wars in p2p financ-
ing, ride-hailing, bicycle sharing, online (and offline) cash back shopping [12]. In many
cases, the competition is so fierce that the number of rivals has been reduced from hun-
dreds or thousands to a dozen or smaller, but consumed investment capitals increasing
from millions to billions of dollars. Therefore, we make it the objective of the market
maker to maximize the total number of customers who would take the offer and en-
joy the goods and services provided, given a fixed budget for the welfare improvement
campaign.
While entrepreneurs fight to gain an advantage over opponents via financial invest-
ment, customers enjoy and benefit from the competing platforms’ price wars. In that
perspectives, we view them as efforts by goods and service providers to improve the
welfare of customers. By sacrificing a portion of (future) profit, reduced prices can
provide the necessities for some customers who would otherwise be not able to afford
it. However, from one company’s perspective, simply setting lower prices or providing
coupons worth more to customers may not always lead to more consumptions. This
is because customers have limited demand for consumptions and may have inherent
preference for specific company’s products. And its opponents may also increase their
investments at the same time, resulting in an equal attraction for customers. This means
on behalf of a company, providing coupons seems to have no effect on attracting cus-
tomers, but in fact it will loss some customers if providing nothing to them.
Indeed, entrepreneurs’ fighting in an Internet price war can be viewed as playing
an imperfect and incomplete information game, to gain an advantage over opponents
via financial investment. One may distinguish between games with imperfect and per-
fect information through whether the opponents’ potential strategies are accessible to a
player. For example, in chess or go game, each player knows all possible plays his op-
ponent can do at any step, meaning it is a perfection information game. On contrast,
in card games each player’s cards are often hidden from others, thus it is an imperfect
information game, and so is the Internet price war since participant companies have
no information about how their competitors provide personalized price reduction. On
the other hand, the win/loss outcome of chess, go game and card games, formally the
structure of these games is known to all players after their plays, which means they are
complete information games. However, in an Internet price war, companies do not
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know how customers make their choice after receiving awards, thus not able to calcu-
late their utilities accurately even if they know other companies’ strategies. Such a lack
of customers’ preference means it is also an incomplete information game.
If we are able to reveal these kinds of missing information, we can find the best
strategy for playing such a game, and also to obtain a better understanding of the price
war. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is a powerful tool to learn the latent vari-
ables, which have been applied in a lot of fields, such as text processing [3], causal
inference [14], image classification [5] and so on. Thus we also consider the LDA
model for this scenario. It characterizes the interactions using the observable informa-
tion about consumptions in one’s own company as a variable dependent on customers’
preferences, which is in turn also dependent on both its strategy and its competitors’
strategies of providing price reduction. Aided by the LDA, we can infer the latent vari-
ables to approximately characterize the environment and further seek better strategies
through other decision-making algorithms like Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL).
The combined method forms a complete framework to deal with imperfect information
scenario, inferring latent variables through LDA first and find better strategies based
on transferred perfect information environment.
To show that the inferred information is useful in the part of decision making, we
conducted experiments on simulated Internet price war game, playing against baseline
methods by using our framework. Then we apply our LDA on an open dataset from
real business and evaluate the results by comparing prediction likelihood with baselines
and distribution distance to the real distribution. All these experiments justify our
framework’s effectiveness.
1.1 Related Works
Studies of price wars can be traced back to 1955 for the automobile industry [4], and
subsequently for airlines industry [2], retail [30], wireless networks service [19]. Such
a competitive business environment was modeled as an imperfect information game
[8]. [13] and [24] offer guidance for avoiding or terminating the war. Researches also
consider strategies for setting proper prices after modeling these competitions [7, 26,
31]. None studies micro operating strategies when a price war is inevitable.
In recent years, reinforcement learning [29] is commonly believed to be useful in
making strategies in game scenarios with opponents. For example, [10] suggested an
opponent modeling method adding to the action set of deep reinforcement learning.
And another famous application for imperfect information game is by [11], who pro-
pose an approach named NFSP to solve the approximated Nash Equilibrium through
DRL with fictitious self-play. Their work seeks strategies under partial observed infor-
mation directly but has no understanding for that unknown information.
On the other hand, exploring hidden information from observed data have been
common desired in applications of data mining like recommend systems [18], infor-
mation retrieval [32], statistical natural language processing [16] and so on. Among
them, probabilistic graphical models are widely used since its huge success in classify-
ing topics from contexts [3]. Similar to our work, graphical models have been applied
on inferring users’ preference from user-generated data, such as [9] understanding the
preference of mobile device user and [33] finding buyers’ preference on e-commerce
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search results. But in these works, latent variables are never under the competitive envi-
ronment, and as far as we know, there is no application that models one’s competitor’s
strategies as a latent variable before this work.
1.2 Organization of the Article
Section 2 outlines the problem definition through a game theoretical characterization
for the Internet price war. And section 3 designs the LDA for hidden information from
the environment in reality. In Section 4 and 5, 6, we test our model systematically on
simulated data and verify its suitability on a real open dataset and practical business
environment. Finally, we conclude our contributions in Section 7.
2 Game Characterization for Internet Price War
In this section, we formalize the Internet price war through a game theoretical char-
acterization. It is the first time, as far as we know, that such an important marketing
phenomenon is formalized in a combined form of both macroscopical competition and
microcosmic strategies.
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Figure 1: The Internet Price War Game.
2.1 Problem Definition
As shown in Fig.1, in an Internet price war, each company (indexed by i = 1, . . . ,M )
announces personalized awards btij (b
t
ij ∈ {0, . . . , Bi}, w.l.o.g 0 means no award) for
each customer in the market (indexed by j = 1, . . . ,m) during time period (t, t + 1)
if the customer purchases its products. Customer j consumes ntj times during the
period, for example one week, and let ctj,k = i if he chooses company i for his k-th
consumption. He makes these choices according to his preference function, represented
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by the probability ptj(~b
t
j , i) he chooses company i for each consumption with respect
to received awards~btj = (b
t
1,j , b
t
2,j , . . . , b
t
M,j).
The objective for each company i is to find the best strategy on providing awards
btij to maximize its market share after R time periods, formally
max
btij ,1≤j≤m,1≤t≤R
∑
j,k,ctj,k=i
1/
∑
j
ntj , (1)
under budget constraint
∑
j cost(b
t
i,j) ≤ budgetti, for 1 ≤ t ≤ R.
Corresponding to real Internet price war, each company i only has its own transac-
tion data, i.e. records of customer j who received award btij and purchased company
i’s products during time period (t, t+1), formally {(t, j, btij , ctj)|ctj,k = i}. This means
(1) company i does not know how its opponents choose awards bti′j for i
′ 6= i, so it is
playing an imperfect information game; (2) company i does not know how customers
decide their consumptions ctj,k, so it is playing an incomplete information game.
2.2 Basic Assumptions
In a price war, participants are willing to provide awards for customers mainly because
of two important assumptions on customers’ behavior patterns:
• In each short time period, say (t, t + 1), customers have higher probability to
choose one specific company if it offers award of higher value, that is vi(bti,j) >
vi(b
′t
i,j) implies
ptj(b
t
i,j , b
t
−i,j , i) > p
t
j(b
′t
i,j , b
t
−i,j , i).
• After each time period, say (t, t + 1), the preference of customer j on choosing
company iwithout any award tend to his usage rate ui =
∑
k,ctj,k=i
1/
∑
k,ctj,k=i
′ 1
of it, that is
(pt+1j (~0, i)− ptj(~0, i)) ∗ (ui − ptj(~0, i)) ≥ 0.
Such an evolution of customers’ preference, and further evolution of related outcome
function for all players in the game, make it a stochastic game. For the sake of analysis,
we assume customers make their decisions ctj,k at any time t only depend on the award
bti,j each company offers, but are unrelated to the total number of his consumptions n
t
j
in the period (t, t+ 1), nor to other buyers’ choice.
And for companies, since we are considering this problem from one company’s
perspective, all his competitors can be regarded as one opponent. Meanwhile, as mod-
ern marketing always does, companies cluster customers into several groups, each of
which contains customers of similar behavior.
Now the process of the Internet price war can be precisely described by Alg. 1.
3 Latent Dirichlet Allocation for Price War Game
We model the process of each customer choosing company 1 to consume, called the
Internet Price War LDA, as shown in Figure 2. We omitted the superscripts about time
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Algorithm 1: The Process of the Internet Price War
Input: R, m, budgeti, i ∈ {1, 2}
Output: The market share of each company, s1, s2
1 Initialize company i, i ∈ {1, 2} and customer j with their private vj and p0j ,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
2 for t← 1 to R do
3 for j ← 1 to m do
4 bt1,j ← company 1 choose a award for customer j
5 budget1 ← budget1 − cost(bt1,j)
6 bt2,j ← company 2 choose a award for customer j
7 budget2 ← budget2 − cost(bt2,j)
8 for k ← 1 to nj do
9 ctj,k ← ptj(bt1,j , bt2,j)
10 pt+1j ← update ptj according to ctj
11 s1 =
∑
j,k,ctj,k=1
1/
∑
j n
t
j
12 s2 =
∑
j,k,ctj,k=2
1/
∑
j n
t
j
and subscripts about customers for expressions of all variables.
Figure 2: The Internet Price War PGM.
3.1 Price War LDA
In this subsection, we first show the generative process of observed data in the game of
price war, then we introduce the details.
• Choose a preference distribution ~p ∼ Dir(β)
• For the each customer j, choose a strategy distribution ~θ ∼ Dir(α)
• Customer j decides to conumse nj times
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• Company 2 chooses an award b2 ∼ ~θ
• Company 1’s choice of the award b1 is known
• For each consumption ck,j , k = 1, 2, . . . , nj ,
– customer j chooses the company ck,j ∼ ~p(b1, b2)
• Company 1 observes that customer j has c consumptions, where c =
∑
k,ck,j=1
1
At the beginning of each time period, company 1 decides to provide customer j
with award b1, while his opponent company 2 provide b2. Company 2 decide b2 accord-
ing to some strategy ~θ, representing the probabilistic distribution of all possible awards,
but the exact award b2 and the distribution ~θ is unknown to company 1. Meanwhile,
customer j’s preference function is simplified as ~p = p(b1, b2) as the probabilistic dis-
tribution on choosing company 1 to consume with respect to all possible awards pair
(b1, b2). And in this period, the customer plans to consume n times in total, which is
subject to a distribution of ~n. For each consumption, he chooses one specific company
according to the preference distribution ~p along with actually received awards (b1, b2),
thus company 1’s observed records c consist of his all consumptions on it in the period.
Since we focus on the probability that customer j will choose company 1, we consider
the cn as observed data. For
c
n is in [0, 1], we define a function g(·) = x cn ∗accy to dis-
cretize their value into a new range according to required accuracy acc. It is noticeable
that we figure out the the distribution of ~n by statistics in advance, rather than inferring
it by LDA. When we infer the latent variables, we sample n till c ≤ n in order to avoid
that n < c.
Without loss of generality, we assume the hidden variables ~b2 and ~p is from two
Dirichlet distribution Dir(~α) and Dir(~β). We define ~p as the multinomial distribution
on the {0, acc − 1} with size of |B1| ∗ |B2|, where |B1| is the number of awards
company 1 provides and |B2| is the number of awards we assume the opponent offers.
And we define ~b2 as the multinomial distribution on the {0, . . . , |B2|}. And on behalf
of company 1, we assume that company 2 is using the same strategy ~θ for a specific
customer in recent several periods of time, say T . Meanwhile, we assume company
1 has clustered customers into groups, so that customers in each group have the same
preference functions. Thus company 1 could use records for each group of customers
in the normalized form (j, t, b1, g( cn )), where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
Then it is able to get approximations for the distribution of his opponent’s strategy ~θ for
each customer j and the preference function ~p for these group of customers by solving
the Price War LDA.
3.2 Inference
We use the Gibbs Sampling method to solve our LDA. The joint probability of the
opponent’s bonus ~b2 and count ~c can be factored into the following:
Pr(~c, ~b2|~b1, ~n, α, β) = Pr(~c|~b1, ~b2, ~n, β)Pr(~b2|α)
Gibbs sampling will sequentially sample each variable of interest from the distri-
bution over that variable given the current values of other variables and the data.
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According to Gibbs Sampling, and letting the subscript−i denote the statistic value
for an variable without the i-th sample, the conditional posterior for pi and b2,i is
Pr(b2,j,i = k|~b2,−i, ~p−i,~ci, α, β, b1, n)
∝ {N
(h)
b1,k
}−i + β
{Nb1,k}−i + accβ)
∗ {N
(k)
j }−i + α
{Nj}−i + |B2|α)
(2)
Here N (h)b1,k is the number of times g(
c
n ) = h when given (b1, k) and Nb1,k is the
total number of records when given (b1, k). N
(k)
j is the number of times customer j
receives k from company 2 and Nj is the total number of consumptions of customer j.
3.3 Postprocessing
It is worth noting when we get ~pj1(b1,j1 , b2,j1) and ~pj2(b1,j2 , b2,j2) via the different
records of customer j1 and customer j2, then they don’t represent the distributions of
the same pair of awards if (b1,j1 , b2,j1) = (b1,j2 , b2,j2). The reason is that we do not
assign an exact award of opponents when inferring, but ids to represent then, thus the
ids may indicate different actions in different times. In order to avoid the situation,
we assume that the opponent has |B2| actions, where vj(x1) < vj(x2) if x1, x2 ∈ B2
and x1 < x2. According the Assumption 2 in Section 2.2, the expectation of the
consumptions of customer j on company 1 when b2 = x1 should larger than the one
when b2 = x2 if x1 < x2. Thus we can sort the inferred preference distribution ~p
accordingly when b2 is fixed, then we can get all ~p in the same order.
4 Simulations Experiments
In this section, we introduce the experiments on the simulation framework to show that
the distributions learned from our LDA is useful for coupon decision to achieve more
market share. Firstly we explain how we simulate the price war under a behavior evo-
lution framework for customers. Secondly, we introduce some methods able to utilize
the distributions, like Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) and Dynamic Program-
ming (DP).
4.1 Preference Evolution Framework Settings
To evaluate our method through numerical experiments, we design a preference evolu-
tion framework to simulate how customers act in a price war, motivated by Sethi and
Somanathan [27].
Preference Function: Here we focus on the situation when customer j receiv-
ing awards bt1 and b
t
2 from company 1 and company 2 respectively. At time t = 0
a customer has an initial preference distribution p0j (b1, b2, 1) on choosing company
1, dependent on the difference d = vj(b1) − vj(b2) between the value of awards he
receives from both companies. The preference for choosing company 2 is naturally
1 − p0j (b1, b2, 1) and we do not mention it specifically in the followings. We define
vj(x) = cost(x) = x in our simulated experiments, and the notation for ptj(b1, b2, 1)
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can be simplified as ptj(d). The preference distribution takes the same form as a Sig-
moid function except its mean value modified to customer j’s inherent preference for
choosing company 1 when no award is provided. That is letting p0j (d) = Sig(d, σ) for
∀d where
Sig(d, σ) =

σ
0.5
× ( 1
1 + e−d
− 0.5) + σ if d < 0
1− σ
0.5
× ( 1
1 + e−d
− 0.5) + σ if d > 0
(3)
and σ = ptj(0). And whenever σ is determined, the whole function can be determined.
We choose the preference function in this form because (1) it increases monotonously
as the value difference between awards from two companies increases, corresponding
to Assumption 1 in Section 2.2; (2) it accords with the property of diminishing marginal
returns.
Updating Process: During the period (t, t+1), customer j consumes for ntj times,
each of which is independently subject to the preference distribution ptj(d
t), where
dt = vj(b
t
1) − vj(bt2) is the value difference of his actual received awards. After that,
we can calculate the usage rate uti,j . According to Assumption 2 in Section 2.2, we let
the updating formula to be:
pt+1j (0) = (u
t
i,j − ptj(0)) ∗ γ + ptj(0) (4)
, where γ is a parameter reflecting how sensitive the customer is to the awards, called
updating rate. Then the whole preference distribution can be calculated accordingly as
pt+1j (d) = Sig(d, p
t+1
j (0)) for ∀d.
4.2 Some Methods can utilize the information
In this subsection, we introduce some methods which take the advantage of the distri-
butions learned from our model.
4.2.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Deep Reinforcement Learning is a flexible framework for Markov Decision Process.
The input of DRL only requires a fixed-length vector, which usually represents the state
of the observed environment. Thus we directly combine the preference distributions
and strategy distributions with the raw features vectors. DRL also pays attention to
model the transitions between different states, which may be a good model for the evo-
lution of customers’ preferences and the transformation of the opponents’ strategies. It
is also a framework of optimization, thus we do not need other extra operations. Thus,
we design a DRL framework to utilize the information of LDA, as followed:
State: stj contains three parts, consumptions history htj of customer j before time
t, preference distribution p
′t−1
j and award distribution b
′t−1
j of the opponents learning
from htj , which are the approximation of p
t−1
j and b
t−1
j . As the preference and award
of opponent may change litte in a short period, i.e, (t − 1, t), we can consider the
pt−1j ≈ ptj and bt−1j ≈ btj . Therefore, we add the preference and opponents’ award of
9
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time t− 1 into state stj . In this paper, we simply concat three parts, that
stj =
 htjptj
b
′t−1
j
 (5)
The transition is from st−1j to s
t
j for each state.
Action: The btj , that the award we choose for customer j at time t is in {0, .., |B1|},
where B1 is the set of actions predefined. In our deep reinforcement learning, the
Action only consists of all the possible value of awards in an interval pre-announced
by a company. And for the convenience of experiments, we further discretize those
value.
Reward: In a price war, when a company provide the award btj to a customer
represented by stj , the number of consumptions he chooses the company is a nature
Reward. But in real marketing, such feedback should also include a factor of cost as
a negative part, since companies have limit budgets. As a result, Reward = c − ξ ∗
cost(btj), where c represents the number of consumptions and ξ is the parameter to
control the weight of two parts. The reason why a company’s remainder budget are
not included in State is because the company cannot be sure how many customers it
will capture after providing the award. On contrast, the average cost of attracting a
customer matters more than the total money spends in the end.
Framework: Fig. 3 show the overall framework. We adopt the Deep-Q-Network
[20] as the version of DRL. The inputs of DQN are itemized above. The optimization
process can be defined as
Qt(stj , a) = (1− α)Qt(stj , a) + α(Reward+ λmax
a
Q(st+1j , a)) (6)
where α is the learning rate and λ is the discount factor.
4.2.2 Dynamic Programming
Since we learn the preference distributions and strategy distributions, we can do opti-
mizations directly according to these kinds of information. In precise, we define f(i, k)
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as the maximum market shares we can get when we finish offering awards to the first i
customers costing k budgets. Then we take advantage of Dynamic Programming (DP)
to learn the optimal result of f(m, budget) in every single round. Finally, we choose
the coupon corresponding to the optimal solution for each customer as our policy.
Formally, the transition equation for solving f(i, k) is
f(i, k) = max
1≤j≤|B|
(f(i− 1, k − j) + ψ(i, j)) (7)
ψ(i, j) is expected benefit from customer i if we offer award j to him, which is calcu-
lated by
ψ(i, l) =
|B|∑
l=0
bi(j)pi(j, l) (8)
where bi(j) is the probability that the opponent choose bonus j for customer i, and
pi(j, h) is the probability that the customer i choose our company if it received j from
us and l from the opponent. And we choose the award j∗ that maximizes Eq. (7) for
the i-th customer.
4.3 Other Baseline Methods
To evaluate our model, we conduct a series of simulation experiments. In the experi-
ments, company 1 uses the DRL or DP as introduced before, to play against company
2 using the baseline method as following:
• Random Strategy is referred to a company randomly choosing one of the pos-
sible awards for each customer with equal probability.
• Deep-Q-Network(DQN) [20] is a version of DRL. Note that the settings of this
DQN are exactly the same as the ones mentioned in the subsection 4.2 except its
state does not include features about the customer’s preference and opponent’s
strategy.
4.4 Other Settings
Other experimental settings such as the parameters of the preference evolution frame-
work, the parameters of the deep reinforcement learning model, and different variants
are explained below:
• Simulated Environment: In the simulated environment, there are 10 kinds of
customers at all, each of which has 1000 persons. The initial σ = 0.5, updating
rate γ = 0.5. ntj ∈ [1, 100] for ∀j, t There are two companies in the markets at
all. Each company has 5 kinds of awards, B1 = B2 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, with the
same amount of budgets, budget1 = budget2 = 20000.
• Learning Methods: We adopt Deep Q-Network [20] (DQN) as our DRL method.
The network has 3 layers, the sizes of which are Ninput, 512, 5, where Ninput is
the size of input features. The reward function is reward = ctj − 0.5 ∗ cost(btj).
The learning rate is 0.01 and memory size is 200000. The reward decay rate is
0.9.
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• Variants: Here since the approximation solution to LDA are two sets of vari-
ables, representing customers’ preference and opponent’s strategy, we do exper-
iments of adding these two features to DQN’s states separately and together, and
they are referred as ”DQN + P”, ”DQN + S” and ”DQN + LDA” respectively.
And the DP introduced before requires both features, it is simply referred as
’DP’.
4.5 Results
We list the final market shares of company 1 after 1000 rounds in Table 1. It uses
the variants of our methods (DQN, DQN+P, DQN+S, DQN+LDA and DP), playing
against company 2 using Random Strategy or DQN. The market share is the average
value taken from 10 repeated experiments.
DQN DQN + P DQN + S DQN + LDA DP
Random 58,59% 68.05% 67.26% 69.57% 76.12%
DQN 50.22% 55.84% 56.72% 65.16% 54.63%
Table 1: Comparison of market share. The number in the i-th row is the market share of company
1 when company 1 uses the i-th method in the first row playing against company 2 using the j-th
method in the first column.
Generally speaking, our methods get market shares over 50% when competing
with Random Strategy and DQN, which do not include specific information about
customers’ preference and opponent’s strategy. This means that the inferred latent
variables from the Price War LDA, either separately or joint together, are helpful to
characterize the environment of an Internet price war.
Meanwhile, DP shows the best result when playing against Random Strategy, while
DQN + LDA performs best against DQN. This coincides with common sense as Ran-
dom Strategy is not evolving along with time, which means DP can learn the optimal
solution with respect to known information. When the opponent is using a complicated
method like DQN, DQN + LDA is the most effective method because it models both
the transition of the evolving environment and inferred information. .
And Fig.4 shows the average market share of company 1 after t time periods, when
using different strategies competing against company 2 using baseline methods. We
can find that the convergence procedures in the Fig. 4 (a) is faster and more stable than
the ones in the Fig. 4 (b). The reason is that Random Strategy can be considered as the
static environment, while DQN is evolving along with the rounds. This is in line with
the intuition.
5 Real-World Dataset Analysis
In the simulated experiments, the latent information inferred by our model has shown
great help in finding strategies to earn more market share. And in this section, we
apply our model on a real-world dataset and conduct a series of experiments, to prove
12
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Figure 4: Market share curves in simulation experiments.
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that the model can indeed infer our desired latent information. We first introduce our
open dataset, followed by our preprocessing methods. Then, we provide quantified
evaluation results compared with the baselines and finally analyze the results of our
method from different aspects.
5.1 Coupon Usage Data for O2O
Coupon Usage Data for O2O, referred to O2O Dataset in following description, is an
open dataset from the Tianchi contest [1]. O2O represents ”online to offline”, while a
typical example of ”O2O marketing” is that merchants in a shopping mall send coupons
to potential customers through emails or short messages in their own APPs. Merchants
want to attract customers to their offline shops and decide these personalized discount
rate of coupons based on a large amount of users’ behavior and location information
recorded by various APPs.
In our experiment, we make use of the offline training data from O2O Dataset,
where the coupon promotion is conducted by 7737 retail stores from Jan. 1st 2016 to
June 30th 2016. There are 1,048,575 records in total, among which there are 255,550
users receiving 9280 kinds of coupons. In precise, each record consists of identifi-
cations for a user, a merchant and a coupon (or ’null’ if no coupon was provided),
distance between the merchant and the user, the discount rate of the coupon, the date
when the coupon was sent and the date when the coupon was used (or ’null’ if it was
never used). After basic data cleaning and statistics, we know that on average each
user receives 1.986 coupons, while on average each kind of coupons is sent to 37.637
customers. Generally speaking, 7.12% coupons are used.
5.2 Preprocess
Unlike the simulated data, it requires a preprocessing at first for our model to apply
on the real-world data. According to our model, it requires data for users with similar
preference in each group, called preference group. And in each group, the opponent
may adopt different strategies to different people. Since in the practice, we know nei-
ther the preferences of the users nor the strategies of the opponents, we need to cluster
the data twice. Now we introduce the main steps of our preprocessing in detail.
5.2.1 Agents
Firstly, we consider each merchant in O2O Dataset as an agent in such a competitive
environment, providing coupons to attract customers. In practice, each merchant is
only accessible to those records related itself. And since our LDA can help infer latent
variables on behalf of one agent, we choose the merchant with id 3381 as the company
1 in our model, since it has the largest number of records in the dataset. Then all other
merchants are considered together as its opponent, in other word, the company 2 in our
model.
To be precise, there are 74823 records related to company 1, among them, 8 kinds
of coupons are provided to 64152 users. Those coupons, according to their discount
rate, can be divided into three groups, namely coupons of level low, middle and high
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(denoted by 1,2,3 respectively). Another reason why we do not maintain the original
types of coupons is that the number of records about offering each kind of coupons
varies a lot.
5.2.2 Preference Group Clustering
To determine users with similar preference distribution (denoted by P ), we cluster
them into 4 different groups based on features only related to the merchant and users
themselves.
5.2.3 Strategy Group Clustering
As we introduced before, our model considers the opponent adopts a stable strategy
distribution, (denoted by S), for each user. But in O2O Dataset, the number of records
for each user is too small. Therefore, we cluster users in each preference group into 10
different subgroups based on features only related to themselves. These subgroups are
called strategy group, and we assume the opponent adopts the same strategy distribu-
tion for users in each strategy group.
Algorithm 2: Preprocess of Coupon Usage Data
Input: Dataset D, company 1, number of preference group N , number of
strategy group M
Output: The preference distribution {P1, . . . , PN}, the strategy distribution
{S1,1, . . . , SN,M}
1 PG1, . . . , PGN ← Cluster the users in the D according to their preference to
company 1.
2 for i← 1toN do
3 SGi,1, . . . , SGi,M ← Cluster the users in PGi according to the opponent’s
strategies. Pi, Si,1, . . . , Si,M ← LDA({SGi,1, . . . , SGi,M})
5.3 Evalution
In this subsection, we apply our model on the dataset and evaluate it by measuring
its behavior prediction and inferred strategy distribution, to show that our model is
effective.
5.3.1 Behavior Prediction
We first train our model on the training dataset, then we use our model to predict the
behaviors of users in the testing dataset. We evaluate our model on the measurement
of negative log likelihood for prediction, compared with some baselines.
Mathematically, negative log likelihood is defined as
L(θ) = −
N∑
i=1
log(p(yi|θ, xi))
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, where θ is the model we want to evaluate, N is the number of samples, xi is the
features and yi is the ground truth of sample i, p(yi|θ, xi) is the output probability of
yi from model θ when given xi. The smaller the likelihood of prediction is, the better
the corresponding model is. And in our experiments, N = 7284 for our model, as well
as all the baselines.
We consider 5 common the probabilistic prediction models as baselines:
• Naive bayesian (NB) [25]
• Logistic Regression (LR)
• Support Vector Machine (SVM) [22]
• Random Forest (RF) [17]
• Neural Network (NN) [15]
All the above baslines are implemented by sklearn [21]. And their input features are
the same extracted features we using for LDA.
Table 2: Comparison of Negative Log Likelihood
Model NB LR SVM RF NN LDA
Result 494.93 580.26 1085.40 597.93 509.26 401.97
As shown in Tab.2, our model get the smallest negative log likelihood in prediction,
meaning that it provides the best modeling for the real-world data.
5.3.2 Distance of Strategy Distributions
We also evaluate the distribution distance between our strategy distribution and the real
strategy distribution. The real strategy distribution for each strategy group is calculated
by the number of coupons that all other merchants in the whole dataset provide to users
in the group. Similar to the preprocessing, these coupons are also divided into three
groups as level low, middle and high according to their discount rate. We adopt the
Wasserstein Distance [23] to measure the distance of two distribution, which is defined
as
W1(~p, ~q) = infpi∈Γ(~p,~q)
∫
R×R
|x− y|dpi(x, y)
, where Γ(~p, ~q) denotes the collection of all joint distributions onR×Rwhose marginals
are ~p and ~q on the first and second factors respectively.
We consider two distributions as our baselines.
• The overall distribution of received coupons. We count the total number of each
kind of coupons that all other merchants in the whole dataset provide to all users
of company 1 as the baseline distribution.
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• Uniform distribution: p = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ), which is what a single merchant may as-
sume for its opponent without knowing further information.
As shown in Tab.3, the distance between our inferred distribution and the real dis-
tribution is the closest.
Table 3: Comparison of Distribution Distance
Model Uniform Average LDA
Result 0.18794 0.13105 0.12303
5.4 Analysis
Unlike the opponent’s strategy that we can calculate from the dataset, the true prefer-
ence distributions of users are hard to know. Therefore we analyze the inferred distri-
butions to show that they are reasonable to some extent.
Firstly, we show the visual results of our preference clustering in Fig. 5. The aim
of preference clustering is to cluster the users with similar preference to one merchant.
From Fig. 5, we can see clearly that the users with the same preference are clustered
together.
1
2
3
4
Figure 5: The visual results of our clustering for preference groups
Then, we show the preference distributions inferred by our model explicitly. Fig. 6
shows the heat-map of preference distributions of four clusters. The block (i, j) with
lighter color represents when users receive (i, j) pair of coupons, the preference they
choose company 1 is higher. ”Low”, ”Middle”, ”High” mean the effects of coupon
respectively, as we introduced in Subsection. 5.2. We can find that when company 1
chooses high coupons, the preference distribution of users is very high, close to 100%.
These results confirm our intuition.
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Figure 7: The histogram of preference distribution in each cluster. In each subfigure, the bars
with the same colors mean that we adopt the same coupon. The ’Low’, ’Middle’, ’High’ in
the x-axis mean represent what coupon the opponent chooses respectively. The ’Infer Aver-
age’ represent the mean preference regardless of the opponent’s coupons when we choose the
corresponding coupon. The ’Real Average’ represent the average usage rates of the coupons
regardless of the opponent’s coupons when we choose the corresponding coupon.
We also plot the histogram of the distribution of preference in Fig.7. The histogram
of preference distribution in each cluster. In each subfigure, the bars with the same col-
ors mean that we adopt the same coupon. The ’Low’, ’Middle’, ’High’ in x-axis rep-
resent what coupons the opponent chooses respectively. The ’Infer Average’ represent
the mean preference regardless of the opponent’s coupons when we choose the corre-
sponding coupon. The ’Real Average’ represent the average usage rates of the coupons
regardless of the opponent’s coupons when we choose the corresponding coupon. It is
easy to see that when we choose the high effective coupon and the opponent choose the
low effective coupon, the preference to us is very high. The most noticeable results in
the Fig. 7 are the comparisons between ’Infer Avg’ and ’Real Avg’. We can find that
if ’Real Avg’ is higher than other clusters, the ’Infer Avg’ is higher than other clusters
too except the cluster 1, which is in line with the intuition.
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6 Practical Financial Scenario
In this section, we present our experiments on real financial data in two aspects.
Dataset We also evaluate our methods on the real business dataset from a company.
The dataset is selected from its marketing records for its new service in September
2017, when coupons of different types were sent to customers to attract them to use the
service. The dataset contains customers’ features (264 related attributes, such as one’s
resident, age, gender and so on), types of their received coupons, and their response
(whether they used the service) in the next 15 days. The ratios of the positive and
negative samples is close 1 : 200.
Likelihood On Real Data Similar to Section 5, we apply our model to this dataset,
infer hidden variables from training data and make predictions on the testing data ac-
cordingly. We calculated its negative log-likelihood and compared it with those got
from other baselines.
Table 4: Comparison of Likelihood
Model NN NB LR LDA
Result 449.52 701.56 1432.85 259.60
As shown in Table 4, 10000 records from the dataset are used, among which 90%
is used for training and the rest for testing. The negative log likelihood of our method’s
predictions on testing data is significantly smaller than other models, which means our
method captures the users’ behaviors much better.
Practical Financial Marketing With the help of the company, we tested our method
on practical marketing for the same service. Similar to the process as the simulation ex-
periments, we applied the DRL framework for Price War with the information learning
from the Price War LDA (Fig. 3) to practical financial marketing. In December 2017,
600,000 customers of the company were divided randomly into three groups of the
same size. Our framework decides awards for customers from one group, while Ran-
dom Strategy and the standard DQN for other two respectively as baselines. Within two
weeks after receiving awards, 2.8053% customers from the first group use the product,
while 2.1697% of the second and 2.4966% of the third.
Compared with the usage rate of Random Strategy, our method got an improve-
ment of 29.29% on usage rate, while DQN only got 15.07%. This means our method,
considering opponent’s strategy and customer’s preference, do improve the effect of
personalized marketing compared with those do not considering them.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we formalize the Internet price war as an imperfect and incomplete infor-
mation game. We design an LDA to explore unknown variables from one participant’s
perspective. The inferred information is shown to help decision making method, like
DRL and DP, for finding better strategies in simulated experiments. And the model also
exhibits better characterization for an open dataset from a practical business. It is the
first time that LDA is used in a game scenario and makes efforts in the competitive busi-
ness environment. This design not only makes a major contribution towards achieving
better market sharing in an Internet price war but also inspire a novel technique for
dealing with incomplete and imperfect information games.
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